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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950070 
v. : 
MARK E. CHILD, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE QF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals the amount of restitution the trial court 
ordered him to pay pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) 
(1995). The order was based on defendant's guilty plea to one 
count of theft, a second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Where defendant fails to marshal the evidence supporting 
the trial court's finding on the amount that constituted complete 
restitution, has he established that the finding is clearly 
erroneous? The appellate courts will not disturb a trial court's 
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g.. 
In re M.S.. 815 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah App. 1991); State v. 
Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah App. 1990). Defendant must 
marshal the evidence supporting the finding, then show how the 
finding is clearly erroneous in light of the marshaled evidence. 
In re M.S.. 815 P.2d at 1328. 
2. Where defendant did not object to the procedure by which 
the trial court determined a portion of the restitution award, 
may he complain about the procedure for the first time on appeal? 
A defendant's failure to object to procedural defects waives any 
appellate challenge to the procedure. See State v. Peterson, 841 
P.2d 21, 24-25 (Utah App. 1992) (cannot argue on appeal 
unpreserved claim that the trial court required insufficient 
protective procedures in its wire tap order). 
3. Where defendant agreed to pay complete restitution and 
disputed only the amount that constituted complete restitution, 
has he preserved a challenge to the trial court's failure to 
consider statutory factors relevant only to determining whether 
to impose complete, partial, or nominal restitution? Defendant 
has waived this claim because he agreed to pay complete 
restitution. £££, e.g.. State v. Snyder. 747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 
1987) (holding challenge to restitution waived when adequate 
objection not raised below). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
(1995) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of second degree 
felony theft under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) (R. 7-8). 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to one 
count of third degree felony theft and agreed to pay full 
restitution (R. 87-88, 431). The trial court placed defendant on 
three years probation and ordered him to pay both a $5000 fine 
and full restitution (R. 99-100, 471-73) . 
Defendant disputed the amount of restitution the state 
claimed constituted full restitution (R. 468-69), and the trial 
court ordered an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-201(4) (e) (1995), to determine the amount (R. 109, 112, 
118-19, 219, 279, 356). After hearing the evidence and giving 
defendant credit for certain amounts, the trial court found that 
$45,443 constituted full restitution (R. 137-39, 430-37). 
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (R. 145). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In August 1991, Roger B. Ashment hired defendant as an 
office manager for his small construction company ("Star 
3 
Steel")(R. 258, 260, 304). During his employment, defendant 
wrote most of Star Steel's checks, including its payroll checks, 
and maintained Star Steel's checkbook ledger (R. 251-254). Star 
Steel paid defendant a weekly salary and a monthly car allowance 
(R. 251, 253). 
Toward the end of 1992, Mr. Ashment discovered that Star 
Steel vendors were being paid much less than the checkbook 
register indicated -- sometimes thousands of dollars less (R. 
289a-99). 
Mr. Ashment then hired Thomas Sherwood, an accountant, to 
audit Star Steel's accounts (R. 223). The audit targeted 
defendant and identified $47,843.48 in unauthorized expenditures 
(R. 225-26, 232). 
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant claims that the 
record lacks sufficient evidence to support the amount of 
restitution that the trial court awarded. However, defendant 
fails to marshal the evidence supporting the award, focusing 
instead on the evidence he introduced. When properly marshaled, 
the evidence supports the $45,443.00 that the trial court 
determined constituted complete restitution. 
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2. Inadequacy of Process. Defendant complains about the 
trial court's procedures used to resolve whether to credit 
defendant with $13,745.00 defendant claimed to have deposited 
from his own funds. However, defendant did not object to the 
procedures used, has failed to establish any error, and has not 
argued, let alone established, how the procedures undermine 
confidence in the outcome. 
3. Failure to consider statutory factors. Defendant also 
seeks reversal of the restitution order because the trial court 
failed to consider his financial resources and how full 
restitution would burden his other financial obligations. 
However, the restitution statute's plain language required the 
trial court to consider those factors only when determining 
whether to impose restitution or whether to impose complete, 
partial, or nominal restitution. Because defendant agreed to pay 
complete restitution, he waived any challenge to the trial 
court's failure to consider factors relevant only to determining 
whether to impose something less than complete restitution. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant identifies only one issue for appeal: whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in setting the restitution 
5 
amount. Appellant's Brief at 6. In his argument section, 
however, defendant raises three separate challenges to all or 
part of the award: 1) whether there is sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's factual finding that $45,443.00 
constitutes the full restitution defendant agreed to pay, 
Appellant's Brief, at 7-9; 2) whether the trial court's 
procedures provided defendant with an adequate hearing on part of 
the award, id. at 9-10; and 3) whether the trial court should 
have considered certain statutory factors when determining the 
restitution amount, id. at 10. 
POINT I 
WHEN PROPERLY MARSHALED, THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDING THAT $45,443.00 
CONSTITUTED THE FULL RESTITUTION DEFENDANT AGREED TO 
PAY 
Defendant claims the record lacks sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's finding that $45,443.00 constituted 
complete restitution.1 To prevail on this claim, defendant must 
xAs noted above, defendant casts the argument as an abuse of 
discretion claim, contending that the State failed to carry its 
burden of proving the restitution amount. Appellant's Brief at 
6-9 & n.2. Regardless of the nomenclature defendant uses, this 
argument amounts to an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. 
£££ State v. D.M.Z.. 830 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah App. 1992) 
(D.M.Z.'s challenge that the state had not met its burden of 
proof was "essentially . . . based on insufficiency of the 
evidence"). 
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establish that the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous; 
that is, that the amount imposed as full restitution is against 
the clear weight of the evidence. Cf. In re M.S.. 815 P.2d 1325, 
1328 (Utah App. 1991) (sufficiency challenge to factual findings 
in a parental termination case); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 
770 (Utah App. 1990) (challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a denial of a suppression motion). 
In order to meet his burden, defendant must "marshal all the 
evidence supporting the challenged findings and then show that 
despite that evidence, the findings are clearly lacking in 
support." In re M.S. . 815 P.2d at 1328 (Mt]he evidence-
marshaling requirement applies to sufficiency of the evidence 
challenges in both civil and criminal cases, whether tried to the 
bench or to a jury") .2 Rather than marshal the evidence, 
defendant focuses on the evidence supporting his contentions, 
most of which the trial court found incredible. Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991)(arguing only 
2As part of his argument that the trial court abused its 
discretion, defendant contends that the State should bear the 
burden of proving the amount of restitution by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Defendant cites no authority for this proposition, 
and at least one state has rejected that requirement. State v. 
Lack. 650 P.2d 22, 28 (N.M. App.), cert, denied. 649 P.2d 1391 
(N.M. 1982). In any event, the appropriate analysis is whether 
the evidence is sufficient to support the factual finding. 
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selected evidence favorable to appellant's position does not 
satisfy the marshaling requirement). However, when properly 
marshaled, the evidence supports the trial court's finding. 
Mr. Sherwood's audit identified $47,843.48 in apparently 
unauthorized expenditures that defendant made from Star Steel's 
accounts (R. 232). He grouped these expenditures into the 
following categories: 1) payroll overpayments defendant made to 
himself, totaling $1445.84; 2) car allowance overpayments 
defendant made to himself, totaling $818.00; 3) non-payroll 
checks defendant wrote to himself, totaling $16,825.80; 4) checks 
defendant wrote to cash and endorsed, totaling $8,328.50; and 5) 
$18,525.34 in missing checks that Mr. Sherwood had to obtain from 
the banks that defendant either wrote to himself, wrote to cash 
and endorsed, or wrote to utilities that had nothing to do with 
Star Steel (R. 226-32). See also State's Exhibits 1-A to 1-F. 
With one exception, Mr. Ashment testified that defendant had 
no authority to make any of the expenditures identified in the 
audit (R. 252-55) .3 He also testified that defendant falsified 
entries in the check ledger (for example, recording checks that 
3Mr. Ashment conceded that $4 00 was repayment of a loan 
defendant made to Mr. Ashment (R. 256). The trial court excluded 
this amount from the restitution award (R. 430). 
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defendant wrote to himself as payable to other people or 
recording them as destroyed), that many of the checks defendant 
wrote to cash and endorsed were missing, and that defendant 
recorded "different things" in the ledger for the cash checks (R. 
253-54, 301). 
Mr. Ashment further testified that he told defendant to pay 
all of Star Steel's vendors with checks, except in a couple of 
instances where he told defendant to pay cash (R. 264-65). When 
questioned about specific vendors, Mr. Ashment testified that 
defendant should have paid them by check; that if defendant 
cashed a check and paid with cash, he should have recorded the 
purchase in the check ledger; and that defendant did not tell him 
about any cash purchases or record them anywhere (R. 264-72). 
Mr. Ashment testified that legitimate cash purchases, if any, 
would have totaled * [a]t the very, very most, a few thousand 
dollars" (R. 269). 
Mr. Ashment testified that defendant may have paid "a 
couple" of invoices in cash, but that he told defendant to pay 
for all supplies by check (R. 265, 3 94). He also acknowledged 
that defendant had a petty cash fund of approximately $200, but 
testified that it dried up after a couple of months and was never 
replenished (R. 3 94). 
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Defendant claimed that he deposited $13,745 in cash in Star 
Steel's accounts and that the trial court should give him credit 
for that amount (R. 433, Defendant's Exhibit 11). The trial 
court asked Mr. Sherwood to research this amount and respond with 
an affidavit in ten days (R. 435-36). Mr. Sherwood's response 
traced the funds used for $8,875 of the cash deposits to other 
Star Steel accounts and stated that it would take more time to 
trace the remaining deposits (R. 120). The trial court reviewed 
Mr. Sherwood's response and defendant's rebuttal and gave 
defendant no credit for the $13,745 (R. 137, 138-39). 
Defendant conceded that he stole approximately $3,000 from 
Star Steel (R. 345, Defendant's Exhibits 11 & 12). As to the 
other approximately $44,000, however, defendant did not deny 
writing the checks; instead, he offered a myriad of explanations 
attempting to establish that he had authority to do so.4 The 
4Defendant attributed the payroll overpayments to: 1) 
reimbursement for purchasing company supplies with his own money; 
2) defendant lowering his income tax withholding when he needed 
more money; and 3) an extra $465.00 Mr. Ashment paid him for 
preparing his personal income taxes (R. 327-36). Defendant 
explained the car allowance overpayments as money he used to 
purchase supplies and gas to run errands for the company (R. 3 08-
22). Defendant claimed that the checks he wrote to himself were 
part of an elaborate plan to purchase supplies when the Star 
Steel accounts lacked sufficient funds. Defendant claimed he 
would write a personal check for supplies, then deposit the Star 
Steel check he wrote to himself into his account; by the time the 
10 
trial court found defendant's explanations for the payroll and 
car allowance overpayments, and for the nonpayroll checks he 
wrote to himself incredible (R. 431). Those checks totaled 
$38,664.98 (R. 226-32, State's Exhibits 1A-1D). Once the trial 
court discredited defendant's explanations, the State's evidence 
irrefutably supports $38,664.98 of the amount the trial court 
found constituted complete restitution. State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 
878, 879 (Utah App. 1992) (*[u]ltimately, it is the province of 
the trier of fact to determine which testimony and facts to 
believe and what inferences to draw from those facts"). 
The remaining $9,178.50 came from checks defendant wrote to 
cash and endorsed (R. 230-31, State's Exhibits 1-E & 1-F). 
Defendant explained that he used the cash to pay Star Steel's 
vendors (R. 342-43, 380-81, defendant's Exhibits 10 & 11). The 
trial court found that Star Steel had a general policy of paying 
vendors by check, but relied on Mr. Ashment's testimony and the 
invoices to find that defendant paid some vendor invoices in cash 
(R. 431). The trial court noted the evidence lacked clarity and 
faulted defendant for his bookkeeping practices (R. id,). 
checks cleared, Star steel would have sufficient funds to cover 
the Star Steel check defendant wrote to himself (R. 337-40, 375-
76, 380-81) . 
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However, the trial court believed the evidence showed 
approximately $2,300 in cash purchases and reduced the 
restitution amount by $2,000 (R. id.) . 
Although not mathematically precise, the marshaled evidence 
supports the trial court's reduction. Mr. Ashment testified that 
he instructed defendant to pay vendors with checks for tax 
purposes (R. 265). Nevertheless, Mr. Ashment admitted that 
defendant may have paid cash to some vendors, but that any such 
purchases would have at most amounted to a few thousand dollars 
(R. 269). He also testified that defendant failed to tell anyone 
if he was making cash purchases and failed to record them 
anywhere (R. 264-72). Based on this evidence, the trial court's 
factual determination that defendant used no more than $2,000 of 
the cash to pay Star Steel's vendors is not clearly erroneous. 
ISL. fit-. Cook Assoc. V. Warnick. 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983) 
(a defendant should not escape liability for a loss he has caused 
merely because the injured party cannot prove the amount with 
precision).5 
defendant asserts that the $2000 reduction does not cover 
the "few thousand dollars'' Mr. Ashment admitted defendant may 
have spent for legitimate business purposes. Appellant's Brief 
at 8 n.l. However, defendant offers no support for this 
contention. Moreover, the plain meaning of "few" supports the 
contrary conclusion: "few" is defined as meaning a small number. 
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Finally, the record supports the trial court's conclusion 
not to give defendant any credit for the $13,745.00 he claimed to 
have deposited into Star Steel's accounts. Although the trial 
court did not make an express credibility determination 
concerning the $13,745 defendant claimed to have deposited, the 
trial court did note that it had considered Mr. Sherwood's 
analysis and defendant's response and denied defendant any credit 
for that amount (R. 137, 138-39)/ therefore, the trial court 
implicitly found defendant's response incredible, and that 
determination supports its determination not to credit defendant 
with any of the $13,745. State v. Reed, 839 P.2d at 879.6 
Webster's New World Dictionary 518 (2d College Ed.1976) (defining 
few as "a small number"). 
Moreover, defendant did not object to the characterization 
of "few" at the trial level. Thus, because defendant failed to 
preserve the claim and fails to support it now, this Court should 
disregard it. £e& State v, Jennings 875 P.2 566, 569-70 (Utah 
App. 1994) (declining to consider claim that was unsupported by 
authority or argument and not preserved at trial). 
6Defendant also points out that Mr. Sherwood did not trace 
all of the deposits. Appellant's Brief at 9. Defendant never 
objected to this below, failing to preserve the issue for appeal. 
£££, e.g.. State V, Sepulvefla. 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
Moreover, defendant has not established the necessity of 
tracing all of the deposits. The trial court already found 
defendant's biased testimony "not credible" (R. 431-432). When 
defendant offered deposit slips he claimed proved he repaid some 
of the money, the trial court allowed further investigation (R. 
432-36). Subsequently, Mr. Sherwood, whom the trial court had 
13 
Defendant's arguments, at best, show only that he contested 
the State's evidence; that showing fails to establish clear error 
in the trial court's factual determination. State v. Reed. 83 9 
P.2d at 879 (Utah App. 1992) (Reed failed to establish that the 
bench verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence where 
he established only that the defense and prosecution disagreed 
about the crucial facts). Defendant first attacks the validity 
of Mr. Sherwood's figures because Mr. Sherwood did not "know much 
about the [Star Steel's] inner workings." Appellant's Brief, at 
7. Defendant fails to acknowledge, however, that Mr. Ashment, 
Star Steel's owner, verified Mr. Sherwood's figures and analysis, 
specifically testifying that defendant lacked authority to make 
the expenditures Mr. Sherwood identified (R. 200, 255). 
Defendant also claims that the evidence "demonstrated that 
extra payroll checks were appropriate," apparently referring to 
evidence that he sometimes went without a paycheck for a week or 
already found "extremely credible," discovered that the deposits 
he traced came from other Star Steel accounts, not defendant's 
funds (R. 120, 430). This verified the trial court's impression 
that defendant was not credible and left absolutely no reason to 
believe that any of the remaining deposits came from defendant's 
funds. Having again found defendant incredible, the trial court 
was free to conclude that his lack of credibility extended to the 
remaining $5,000 in untraced deposits; that credibility 
determination did not require tracing all of the deposits. 
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two and then took extra paychecks to cover the skipped weeks. 
Appellant's Brief, at 4, 7. This argument ignores that defendant 
offered other explanations for the extra pay he gave himself 
(explanations the trial court found incredible); he did not rely 
on the delay in payroll to explain the overpayments (R. 328-36) . 
More importantly, it ignores the method Mr. Sherwood used to 
calculate the overpayment: Mr. Sherwood calculated the payroll 
overpayments by comparing the total amount defendant should have 
received for the years Star Steel employed him against the amount 
defendant paid to himself (R. 226-27, State's Exhibit 1-A & B). 
Whether defendant received delayed legitimate paychecks would not 
affect Mr. Sherwood's conclusions. 
Defendant also asserts that the evidence established that he 
had to pay cash to cover fifteen to twenty bounced checks, that 
he had authority to keep the excess from certain cash purchases, 
and that he used the sums attributed to car allowance 
overpayments to purchase office supplies. Appellant's Brief at 
7-8. Defendant contends that the trial court should not have 
ordered him to pay for these sums. Again, this evidence came 
from defendant, and the trial court found defendant's evidence 
incredible. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err by 
refusing to reduce the restitution by these amounts. See State 
15 
v. Reed. 839 P.2d at 879. 
Defendant next claims the trial court erroneously required 
him to pay "almost the full amount of restitution requested by 
the State" because defendant explained the purchases and because 
Star Steel could not produce detailed records to support the 
amount defendant stole versus the amount he used to pay vendor 
invoices. Essentially, defendant contends that the trial court 
erroneously imposed the found that the $7,178.50 was part of the 
full restitution it imposed because the State did not prove that 
amount to a mathematical certainty.7 
This claim fails to establish clear error in the trial 
court's finding that defendant used no more than $2,000.00 of the 
$9,178.50 to pay vendors. First, defendant fails to support this 
argument with any legal authority; therefore, the Court need not 
reach its merits. See State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984)(refusing to consider a issue that Amicone supported 
7Although not clear from defendant's brief, this argument 
affects only the $9,178.50 in checks defendant wrote to cash. 
The State's evidence established to a mathematical certainty that 
defendant stole the remaining $38,664.98 (R. 226-32, 252-55, 
State's Exhibits 1-A to 1-D). The trial court discredited 
defendant's explanations for these checks (R. 431). The trial 
court noted the lack of clarity in the evidence only with respect 
to the $9,178.50 (id.): therefore, this is the only amount 
affected by defendant's argument. 
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with no legal authority or analysis). 
Moreover, analogous legal authority refutes defendants 
argument that the trial court could not impose any amount that 
the State failed to establish to a mathematical certainty. Utah 
law does not require a fact-finder to determine civil damages 
with mathematical precision. To the contrary, Utah law 
recognizes that a defendant in a civil case should not escape 
liability for a loss he caused merely because the injured party 
cannot prove the amount of the loss with precision. Cf. Cook 
Assoc, v. Warnick. 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983). The 
wrongdoer, not the injured party, must bear the burden of some 
uncertainty in the amount of damages. Atkin Wright & Miles v. 
NQuntain State Telephone & Telegraph CCt, 709 p.2d 330, 336 (Utah 
1985). Merely because a trial court has sparse evidence on the 
amount of actual damages does not justify denying recovery. 
Terry v, Panek, 631 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1981). 
Defendant caused Star Steel a substantial loss by writing 
checks to cash then keeping most of the cash for himself. 
Although the evidence suggested defendant used a small amount of 
that cash for legitimate business purposes, it also established 
and the trial court recognized that defendant's own conduct made 
it difficult to calculate that amount precisely. Having caused 
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the loss and especially having contributed to the difficulty of 
establishing the amount with precision, defendant bears the 
burden of some uncertainty in establishing the amount. 
Therefore, the trial court's $2,000.00 reduction is not clearly 
erroneous. 
Finally, defendant suggests that the record lacks sufficient 
evidence for the trial court's refusal to credit defendant with 
the $13,745.00 he claimed to have deposited back into Star 
Steel's accounts.8 The trial court asked Mr. Sherwood to 
determine the source of the funds defendant deposited. In a 
responsive letter, Mr. Sherwood traced $8,875 to other Star Steel 
accounts and stated it would take more time to trace the rest (R. 
120). By denying defendant credit for any part of the 
$13,745.00, the trial court implicitly credited Mr. Sherwood's 
evidence about the source of the deposited funds and discredited 
all of defendant's claims concerning those funds. Because the 
trial court apparently disbelieved defendant's evidence, the 
trial court did not clearly err in refusing to apply the 
8It is not entirely clear whether defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support this decision or merely 
the process the trial court used to obtain the evidence. 
Nevertheless, the State will address the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support this determination. The State addresses the 
sufficiency of the process in Point II. 
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$13,745.00 against the restitution imposed. State v. Reed. 839 
P.2d at 879. 
In summary, the extra pay and car allowance defendant paid 
to himself, and the checks he wrote to himself on Star Steel's 
accounts totaled $38,664.98 of the $47,843.48 in missing funds 
identified by the audit. Although defendant offered alternative, 
exculpatory explanations for these expenditures and claimed to 
have replaced some of the money, the trial court, as finder of 
fact, was free to and did disbelieve him. Therefore, defendant 
has only shown that he contested the validity to those amounts; 
that showing fails to establish that that portion of the trial 
court's finding was clearly erroneous. The $7,178.50 in cash by 
which the trial court refused to reduce the restitution amount is 
also supported by the evidence even though the evidence did not 
establish that amount to a mathematical certainty. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT PRESERVED NO CHALLENGE TO AND HAS SHOWN NO ERROR 
IN THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE HEARING ON THE $13,745.00 
Defendant claims that he Mid not receive a full hearing on 
the $13,745.00." Appellant's Brief, at 9. At the conclusion to 
the final restitution hearing, defendant reminded the trial court 
that he contended he deposited $13,745.00 in cash into Star 
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Steel's accounts, and that the court should reduce the $45,443.00 
by that amount (R. 432, Defendant's Exhibit 11). The trial court 
ordered Mr. Sherwood to analyze the deposits identified in 
Defendant's Exhibit 11 and submit an affidavit with his 
conclusions in ten days (R. 435-36). 
Mr. Sherwood submitted a letter to the trial court 
concluding that $8,875.00 of the deposits came from other Star 
Steel accounts and stating that it would take more time to trace 
the remaining deposits (R. 120). Defendant submitted a letter to 
the trial court challenging Mr. Sherwood's conclusions (R. 13 0-
31). Defendant did not, however, object to Mr. Sherwood's 
failure to submit his conclusions in an affidavit. The trial 
court reviewed Mr. Sherwood's and defendant's letters and gave 
defendant no credit for the $13,745.00 (R. 137-39). 
Defendant complains that the procedure denied him a full 
hearing on the $13,745.00 because: 1) Mr. Sherwood stated his 
conclusions in a letter, not an affidavit;9 and 2) the trial 
court did not clarify its reasons for denying defendant any 
defendant concedes that he agreed "that the State could 
submit an Affidavit detailing whether these deposits appeared to 
have been repayment by [defendant]." Appellant's Brief, at 9 n.3 
(emphasis added). Therefore, defendant does not dispute that he 
agreed to an affidavit being filed in lieu of an additional 
hearing. 
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credit for that amount. Appellant's Brief at 9 n.3. Neither 
claim states a basis for reversal. First, when Mr. Sherwood 
submitted a letter instead of an affidavit, defendant did not 
object to his failure to submit an affidavit as the trial court 
had originally ordered. That failure precludes him from 
complaining for the first time on appeal about accepting the 
letter in lieu of an affidavit. See, e.g.. State v. Sepulveda. 
842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1992). 
Defendant's complaint that the trial court failed to clarify 
its reasons for imposing the $13,745.00 also lacks merit. First, 
defendant never requested any clarification from the trial court. 
State v. Bywater. 748 P.2d 568 (Utah 1987)(defendant could not 
complain about the sufficiency of the judge's stated reasons for 
imposing sentence where he did not complain about them on 
appeal) .10 
Second, defendant has cited no authority to support this 
claim; the authorities defendant cites do not control this case. 
Those authorities require the trial court to state its reasons 
10The Utah Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a similar 
case. State v. LakrWTl/ 881 P.2d 900 (Utah App. 1994), cert, 
granted, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995) . Labrum argued that Bywater 
did not control that case, but also argued that the Utah Supreme 
Court should overrule this holding in Bywater. 
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for imposing restitution, or for imposing complete, partial, or 
nominal restitution. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(d)(1) (1995); 
State v. Stayer. 706 P.2d 611, 613-14 (Utah 1985). They do not 
require the trial court to state its reasons for determining the 
amount it finds constitutes complete restitution. Defendant's 
failure to support this argument with adequate controlling 
authority precludes reviewing its merits. State v. Amicone, 689 
P.2d at 1344 
Finally, although not expressly stated, the trial court's 
reasons are apparent from the record. The trial court had 
already credited Mr. Sherwood's evidence over defendant's, 
believing defendant's evidence only to the extent that the 
State's evidence supported it. Mr. Sherwood's response indicated 
that $8,875 of the amount defendant claimed he deposited actually 
came from other Star Steel accounts. The trial court indicated 
it had reviewed both parties' responses on the $13,735.00 and 
denied defendant any credit for it. Therefore, the record 
establishes that the reason the trial court imposed the full 
$13,745.00 is that it did not believe defendant's assertion that 
he had replaced that amount from his own funds. State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (the appellate courts 
presume that the trial court resolved all factual disputes in 
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support of its conclusions and affirm if it is reasonable to find 
facts to support the conclusion). 
Alternatively, defendant also fails to establish how either 
alleged deficiency in the hearing prejudiced him. Defendant's 
failure to allege, let alone establish, prejudice independently 
defeats his challenge to the procedure used. See State v. 
Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987) (upholding trial court's 
restitution order in spite of trial court's error where error was 
"not prejudicial"); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a)(an error that does not 
affect a party's substantial rights must be disregarded). 
Defendant relies on two cases to support his challenge to 
the sufficiency of the hearing; however, those cases do not 
control this case. In State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 
1993), cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994), the defendant 
"never [had] an opportunity to contest the damages" at all. Id. 
at 983. In State v. Starnes. 841 P.2d 712 (Utah App. 1992), the 
trial court erroneously excluded evidence. Id. at 715-16. In 
this case, the trial court never prohibited defendant from 
offering evidence. The trial court gave defendant an opportunity 
to respond to Mr. Sherwood's letter, and defendant availed 
himself of that opportunity. Unlike Johnson and Starnes. 
defendant has identified no evidence that the trial court's 
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procedure precluded him from presenting. 
In short, defendant failed to preserve any challenge to the 
procedure with a timely objection in the trial court, has failed 
on appeal to establish error, has failed to support this claim 
with controlling legal authority, and has failed to establish how 
the alleged deficiencies undermine confidence in the outcome. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT AGREED TO PAY COMPLETE RESTITUTION, 
HE CANNOT NOW COMPLAIN THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO 
CONSIDER FACTORS RELEVANT ONLY TO DETERMINING WHETHER 
TO IMPOSE COMPLETE, PARTIAL, OR NOMINAL RESTITUTION 
As part of his plea bargain, defendant agreed to pay full 
restitution (R. 430). Defendant claims that the trial court 
erroneously failed to consider his financial resources and the 
burden restitution would impose on him when setting the amount 
that constituted full restitution. Appellant's Brief at 10. 
The restitution statute requires the trial court to consider 
these factors only when "determining whether or not to order 
restitution, or restitution that is complete, partial, or nominal 
under this subsection,'' not as part of determining the amount 
that constitutes complete restitution. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
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201(4) (c) (1995) . u Having agreed to pay full restitution, 
defendant waived his right to have the trial court consider the 
statutory factors; that waiver precludes him from making this 
argument for the first time on appeal. See, e.g.. State v. 
Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989) (a defendant cannot 
make a tactical decision to forego an objection, then complain 
about the unobjected-to error on appeal), cert, denied. 497 U.S, 
1024 (1990) . 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the trial court's restitution award. 
Qral Argument Requested 
The State requests oral argument in this case. Primarily, 
the State requests oral argument to address any questions the 
Court may have about the issues raised in the briefs. Oral 
argument may be particularly helpful due to the complexity of the 
nThe legislature has since amended the statute. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1995). 
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financial evidence introduced in this case. 
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-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Definitions — Civil penalties — Restitution — 
Hearing — Aggravation or mitigation of crimes 
with mandatory sentences — Resentencing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) 'Conviction* includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) 'Criminal activities* means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and lo*es including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including insured damages, and payment for ex-
penses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation. 
(e) (i) 'Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim* does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence, 
(a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
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impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution up 
to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or victims of 
the offense of which the defendant has been convicted, or to the victim 
of any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc). 
(b) (i) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 
77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and 
is convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc). 
(c) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution 
that is complete, partial, or nominal under this subsection, the court shall 
take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) (i) When the court determines that restitution is appropriate or 
inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons 
for the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) The court shall send a copy of its order of restitution to the 
Division of Finance. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor, and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear warrant issued for an infraction; 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (aXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
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(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (i) applies to each 
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actu-
ally transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been sentenced and 
committed to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of 
the date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the 
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, recall the 
sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the 
defendant in the same manner as if he had not previously been 
sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no greater than the initial 
sentence nor less than the mandatory time prescribed by statute. 
(ii) The resentencing provided for in this section shall take into 
consideration the sentencing guidelines established under this section 
by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to eliminate 
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. 
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served. 
(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the 
record at the time of sentencing. 
(ii) The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the 
sentence that if the defendant is released from prison he may be on 
parole for a period of ten years. 
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, 
rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse 
of a child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and 
if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by 
the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall 
be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This 
subsection takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law. 
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History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, I 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, I 1; 
1981, ch* 59, i 1; 1983, ch* 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 
88,1 8; 1984, ch. 18, i 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 
1987, ch. 107, | 1; 1990, ch. 81,1 1; 1992, ch. 
142,1 1; 1993, ch. 17,1 1; 1994, ch. 13, i 19. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tions (lXe) and (f) and redesignated former 
Subsection (lXe) as (IX*); subdivided Subsec-
tion (4Xd); substituted "takes precedence over* 
for "supersedes" in Subsection (6Xc); and made 
stylistic changes throughout the section. 
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1,1993, 
added Subsection (1), redesignating the follow-
ing subsections accordingly; subdivided Sub-
section (3); substituted present Subsection 
(4XaXii) for former language requiring the 
court to consider the criteria in Subsection 
(3Xb) and to make the reasons for its decision a 
part of the court record; deleted language relat-
ing to transportation of a defendant from Sub-
section (4XbXi); substituted "Subsection (c)'for 
"Subsection (3XW* and deleted two sentences 




—Bodily injury to victim. 
—Severity of offense. 
Arrest record. 
—Effect on sentence. 
Credit for pretrial detention. 
Discretion of court 
Informal procedure. 












—Right to challenge. 
—Tb insurance company. 
—lb law enforcement agency. 
—Victim not named in information. 
Review. 
Statement of reasons for sentence. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
The minimum mandatory sentencing scheme 
set forth in Subsections 76-5-404.1(4), 76-3-
406X1), and 77-27-9(2) and Subsection (5) of this 
(4XbXii); inserted "under this subsection" in 
Subsections (4Xc) and (4Xd); deleted former 
Subsection (4), defining terms; added Subsec-
tion (5); subdivided Subsections (7Xa) and 
(7XW; and made stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
substituted "Subsection (4Xc)" for "Subsection 
(cT throughout Subsection (4) and in Subsec-
tion (7XaXi) substituted "Board of Pardons and 
Parole" for "Board of Pardons." 
Cross-References. — Commission on 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, S 63-25-1 et 
aeq. 
Division of Finance, { 63A-3-101 et seq. 
Removal of officers, J 77-6-1 et seq. 
Restitution as condition of probation, ( 77-
18-1. 
Sentence, judgment and commitment Rule 
22, RCrixxLP. 
Special release from city or county jail, pur-
poses, conditions and limitations, 8 77-19-3 et 
seq. 
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail schedule, 
Code of Judicial Administration, Appx. C. 
section is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. 
Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762 (Utah 1987). 
Aggravating factors. 
—Bodily injury to victim. 
In sentencing 16-year-old defendant who 
pled guilty to first degree murder, child kidnap-
ping, and aggravated sexual abuse of a child, 
trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in 
considering the fact that the victim suffered 
substantial bodily injury as an aggravating 
circumstance. State v. Strunk, 846 P2d 1297 
(Utah 1993). 
—Severity of offense. 
When the trial judge considered the severity 
of the offenses "together with" additional aggra-
vating factors, any error in citing the severity of 
the offenses as an aggravating factor was 
harmless. State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 
1990). 
Arrest record* 
—Effect on sentence. 
Defendant's view that the trial judge was 
unduly influenced by defendant's arrest record 
in imposing concurrent sentences of up to five 
years for two counts of aggravated assault was 
purely speculative, particularly in light of 
unanimous recommendations of the prosecutor 
and the Departments of Corrections and Adult 
Probation and Parole that defendant receive a 
prison sentence. State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 
984 (Utah 1986). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
56 
